# Protecting the Penguin: Linux Security Monitoring with eBPF

## by Sam





## who am i

- Sam
- Ethical Hacking grad (2021)
- Security Analyst at Jane Street
- Linux nerd
- Vegan btw







Announcements | <u>Register</u> | <u>eBay Store</u> | <u>SafeHarbor</u> | <u>Feedback Forum</u> | <u>About eBay</u> | <u>Jobs</u> <u>Go Local!</u> | <u>Go Global!</u> | <u>Canada</u> | <u>UK</u> | <u>Germany</u> | 日本語のヘルプ



## How did we get here??



# JavaScript



## JavaScript



## Makes the **browser programmable**

## Arbitrary code? In my browser?

Safety



Untrusted code can't run wild, we need

sandboxing

#### **Continuous Delivery**



New functionality without shipping new browser, we need *easy integration* 

#### Performance



There should be minimal overhead, so we need

native execution

## Arbitrary code? In my browser?

- **Sandboxing**: each website is isolated
- **Easy integration**: it just runs
- Native execution: JIT compiler

## The browser is now programmable

## JavaScript





- It's an Operating System
- Runs on billions of devices globally
- Free and open source
- Uses the Linux kernel











#### Option 1: Native Support

- Change kernel source code
- Email Linus Torvalds
- Wait a few years for your changes to land
- Wait 5 years for users to upgrade kernel

#### Option 1: Native Support

- Change kernel source code
- Email Linus Torvalds
- Wait a few years for your changes to land
- Wait 5 years for users to upgrade kernel
- Climate change destroy planet

#### Option 1: Native Support

- Change kernel source code
- Email Linus Torvalds
- Wait a few years for your changes to land
- Wait 5 years for users to upgrade kernel
- Climate change destroy planet

#### Option 2: Kernel Module

- Write kernel module
- Compile a few dozen versions
- Create a new package for every distro

#### Option 1: Native Support

- Change kernel source code
- Email Linus Torvalds
- Wait a few years for your changes to land
- Wait 5 years for users to upgrade kernel
- Climate change destroy planet

#### Option 2: Kernel Module

- Write kernel module
- Compile a few dozen versions
- Create a new package for every distro
- Every new kernel release might break it
- If you get it wrong your kernel will crash

#### Option 1: Native Support

- Change kernel source code
- Email Linus Torvalds
- Wait a few years for your changes to land
- Wait 5 years for users to upgrade kernel
- Climate change destroy planet

#### Option 2: Kernel Module

- Write kernel module
- Compile a few dozen versions
  - Create a new package for every distro
- Every new kernel release might break it
  - If you get it wrong your kernel will crash













## Arbitrary code? In my kernel?

#### Safety



**eBPF Verifier**: rejects any unsafe program and provides sandboxing

## Arbitrary code? In my kernel?

#### Safety



**eBPF Verifier**: rejects any unsafe program and provides sandboxing

#### Performance



**JIT Compiler**: generic bytecode compiled to native CPU architecture

## Arbitrary code? In my kernel?

Safety



**eBPF Verifier**: rejects any unsafe program and provides sandboxing

**Continuous Delivery** 



**eBPF Hooks**: programs can be attached, detached and replaced atomically

#### Performance



**JIT Compiler**: generic bytecode compiled to native CPU architecture



## **CONTROL STREET** makes the **kernel programmable**

extended Berkeley Packet Filter

## eBPF hooks

- kprobes
- uprobes
- Tracepoints
- Network packets
- Linux security modules
- Perf events
- etc...



### eBPF hooks



### eBPF hooks



## Demo

## eBPF Hello World

```
SEC("kprobe/__x64_sys_fchmodat")
int demo(void *ctx)
{
    bpf_printk("chmod happened!!\n");
    return 0;
}
```

output:

<...>-123021 [005] d..31 452659.744965: bpf\_trace\_printk: chmod happened!!
<...>-123040 [000] d..31 452660.525742: bpf\_trace\_printk: chmod happened!!
<...>-123060 [000] d..31 452661.354995: bpf\_trace\_printk: chmod happened!!

## eBPF Hello World

- Userspace program makes that syscall
- eBPF application executes
- bpf\_trace\_printk(), a helper function, is called
- Writes to /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/trace\_pipe
- Not that useful! We need some more tools





## eBPF Maps

};

enum bpf map type { BPF MAP TYPE UNSPEC, BPF MAP TYPE HASH, BPF MAP TYPE ARRAY, BPF MAP TYPE PROG ARRAY, BPF\_MAP\_TYPE\_PERF\_EVENT\_ARRAY, BPF MAP TYPE RINGBUF, BPF MAP TYPE PERCPU HASH, BPF\_MAP\_TYPE\_PERCPU\_ARRAY, BPF MAP TYPE STACK TRACE, BPF MAP TYPE CGROUP ARRAY, BPF MAP TYPE LRU HASH, BPF MAP TYPE LRU PERCPU HASH,



enum bpf\_map\_type { BPF\_MAP\_TYPE\_UNSPEC, BPF MAP TYPE HASH, BPF MAP TYPE ARRAY, BPF MAP TYPE PROG ARRAY, BPF MAP TYPE PERF EVENT ARRAY, BPF MAP TYPE RINGBUF, BPF MAP TYPE PERCPU HASH, BPF\_MAP\_TYPE\_PERCPU\_ARRAY, BPF MAP TYPE STACK TRACE, BPF\_MAP\_TYPE\_CGROUP\_ARRAY, BPF MAP TYPE LRU HASH, BPF MAP TYPE LRU PERCPU HASH,



## eBPF Maps

### eBPF Maps

```
struct bpf map def SEC("maps") my map = {
      .type = BPF MAP TYPE ARRAY,
      .key size = sizeof(u32),
      .value size = sizeof(long),
      .max entries = 256,
};
u32 index = 42;
long *value;
value = bpf map lookup elem(&my map, &index);
     if (value)
              sync fetch and add(value, 1);
```

## eBPF Tail and Function Calls

Programs can call other programs!



## eBPF Tail and Function Calls

```
struct {
    __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY);
    __uint(max_entries, 1);
    __uint(key_size, sizeof(__u32));
    __uint(value_size, sizeof(__u32));
} bar SEC(".maps");
```

### eBPF Tail and Function Calls





- Makes the **kernel programmable**
- Hooks let us manipulate and interact with kernel data
- eBPF maps let us maintain and share state
- Tail calls & Function calls let us compose larger programs

How does this make us secure?

## What is Linux Security?



## Linux Security

What do we care about?

- **Detecting** malicious activity
- **Reporting** malicious activity
- **Preventing** malicious activity



## Linux Security

What is activity?

- Network traffic
- File interactions
- Running executables
- Changing privileges

All of this activity makes use of the kernel



## Linux Security

- LD\_PRELOAD
- seccomp
- ptrace
- kprobe tracing



## LD\_PRELOAD

- C library dynamically linked
- Built into Linux
- Enables hooking of any userspace function

## LD\_PRELOAD

- C library dynamically linked
- Built into Linux
- Enables hooking of any userspace function
- Bypassed by static linking!

## Kernel syscall checks

- ptrace
- seccomp
- kprobe tracing (even with eBPF)

## TOCTOU

- Time of Check Time of Use
- Entry point data can be spoofed



Look up DEFCON 29 Phantom Attacks

## Linux Security Modules

- Stable, secure interface
- Safe way to introspect syscall data
- No TOCTOU!
- eBPF lets us access these dynamically



## LSM Hook Demo

## Demo #2

```
SEC("lsm/path_chmod")
int BPF_PROG(path_chmod, const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
{
    bpf_printk("Change mode of file name %s\n", path->dentry->d_iname);
    return 0;
}
output:
```

<...>-128614 [004] d..21 453882.241571: bpf\_trace\_printk: Change mode of file name boop <...>-128634 [010] d..21 453883.248693: bpf\_trace\_printk: Change mode of file name boop <...>-128670 [010] d..21 453884.044865: bpf\_trace\_printk: Change mode of file name boop



## Tetragon





#### **Process lifecycle**

Tetragon observes by default the process lifecycle via exec and exit



#### **Filename access**

Monitor filename access using kprobe hooks



#### **Network observability**

Monitor TCP connect using kprobe hooks



#### Linux process credentials

Monitor Linux process credentials





#### **Security Profiles**

Observe and record security events

## Demo

## More stuff!

- ebpf.io
- What is eBPF? Liz Rice
- libbpf-bootstrap
- libbpf-rs



